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Introduction 
 
Gary McKinnon stands to be imminently extradited from the United Kingdom to the United 
States. He has been charged there with crimes relating to his gaining access to NASA and 
Pentagon computer systems.
1
 McKinnon faces the possibility of a lengthy prison sentence, 
estimated between 8-10
2
 and 70
3
 years in a United States high security prison. To add to the 
severity of this possible fate it has been stated that he has been threatened with rape in jail in 
the United States if imprisoned there.
4
 McKinnon faces this fate in spite of not setting foot in 
the United States in pursuance of his alleged crimes. All his acts were committed from the 
relative comfort of his then girlfriend‘s flat in Wood Green, North London. The only direct 
link between his acts and the United States are bytes of data electronically transferred over the 
internet from London to the United States. As a result of his actions he is sought by United 
States authorities. In response has fought a long legal battle against extradition starting in 
2004. The judicial opposition began in Bow Street Magistrates‘ Court. After losing his 
arguments there his case was passed to the Secretary of State who then ordered his 
extradition. McKinnon then lost appeals in the High Court
5
 and the House of Lords,
6
 and his 
recent petition to the European Court of Human Rights seeking an injunction against 
extradition has also been refused.
7
 This article firstly describes the facts and applicable 
criminal and extradition law in McKinnon‘s case. It then examines his judicial battle against 
extradition. Analysis of salient facts and criticisms of the case then follow. It concludes by 
suggesting that, as the law stands, the long arm of United States criminal law is such that 
those active in cyberspace in the United Kingdom must tread very carefully indeed. 
 
The Facts
8
 
 
McKinnon, 42, was born in Maryhill, Glasgow and is an avid UFO conspiracy theorist, going 
by the codename ―Solo‖. From London between February 2001 and March 2002 he gained 
access to 97 computers belonging to the United States government over the internet. He did 
so through extracting the identities of certain accounts and associated passwords. He then 
installed software called ―Remotely Anywhere‖. This enabled further access and the ability to 
alter data without detection. He also installed further ―hacking tools‖ that allowed him to scan 
over 73,000 United States Government computers. Amongst them were 53 Army computers 
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that controlled its Military District of Washington network and 26 Navy computers, including 
United States Naval Weapons Station Earle, New Jersey. He also saved data onto his own 
computers, including files containing account names and passwords. His actions affected the 
―integrity, availability and operation of programmes, systems, information and data on the 
computers, rendering them unreliable‖.9 The cost of repair was said to total over $700,000. In 
2002 authorities in the United States traced McKinnon to London, and on 19 March 2002, 
pursuant to a request for mutual legal assistance, his computers were seized. Forensic analysis 
confirmed that McKinnon had indeed hacked into the United States computer systems, 
installed software, scanned a large number of computers and affected their integrity. Again 
pursuant to a request for mutual legal assistance, McKinnon was interviewed twice. He 
admitted carrying out a number of acts, including saving onto one United States Army 
computer the statement:  
 
US foreign policy is akin to Government-sponsored terrorism these days… It was not 
a mistake that there was a huge security stand down on September 11 last year… I 
am SOLO. I will continue to disrupt at the highest levels.
10
 
 
Following the investigation two United States Grand Juries issued indictments charging 
McKinnon with criminal offences in respect of these acts. These indictments, of the District 
of New Jersey 31 October 2002 and the Eastern District of Virginia, 12 November 2002, 
detailed the allegations and offences in American law that McKinnon was said to have 
committed.   
 
The Law – Applicable Criminal Law 
 
McKinnon has been charged with a number of offences against section 1030 of title 18 of the 
United States Code, entitled ―Fraud and related activity in connection with computers‖. 
Specifically, McKinnon was charged with seven counts of violating subsections (a)(5)(A)(i), 
(a)(5)(B)(i) and (a)(5)(B)(v) of section 1030. Under the first provision, it is an offence to 
knowingly cause electronic transmissions
11
 which intentionally cause unauthorised damage to 
a ‗protected‘ computer.12 The second and third provisions state that it is a separate offence to 
knowingly cause such a transmission, intentionally access a protected computer without 
authorisation and thereby recklessly or otherwise cause damage which either causes a 
financial loss greater than $5000 or which causes damage to governmental computer systems 
used for national defence, national security or administration of justice purposes. Conviction 
under section (a)(5)(A)(i) carries with it the risk of a fine and a period of imprisonment of up 
to 10 years.
13
 In the case of further charges under this section being proved the term of 
imprisonment increases to 20 years. In such a case, the sentences can run cumulatively.  
 
Extradition law, as will be seen below, requires that not only are the acts criminal in the 
requesting state but also within a jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. This is called the 
double criminality requirement. In McKinnon‘s case the equivalent United Kingdom offences 
are primarily found in the Computer Misuse Act 1990, with the additional possibility of 
liability arising under the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990. At the relevant time, the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990 provided for three principal offences ―unauthorised access‖,14 
―unauthorised access with intent‖15 and ―unauthorised modification‖.16 As of 1 October 2008, 
                                                     
9
 Ibid at para 15.  
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 The provision refers to the transmission of a program, information, code or command.   
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 A ‗protected computer‘ is defined as one used exclusively by the United States Government, by 
subsection (e)(2) of section 1030.  
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 Section 1030(c)(4)(A).  
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 Section 1. Colloquially known as the hacking offence.  
15
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the maximum prison sentences in England and Wales
17
 for these offences has been increased 
and the unauthorised modification offence is now known as the ―unauthorised acts‖ offence.18 
The Police and Justice Act 2006 raised the punishments in the 1990 Act such that the 
unauthorised access offence attracts a maximum 12 month sentence, with the other two 
offences attracting a maximum jail term of 10 years. The Aviation and Maritime Security Act 
1990 created the offence of endangering ship navigation. This offence can be committed by a 
person if they seriously interfere with the operation of apparatus or equipment used for 
maritime navigation.
19
 The offence of endangering ship navigation attracts a life sentence. 
The double criminality requirement appears, therefore, to be satisfied in respect of all the 
crimes McKinnon has been charged with in the United States.   
 
The Law – Extradition 
 
Extradition arrangements with the United States are governed by regulation at two levels, 
international and national. The international instrument is the Extradition Treaty between the 
Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States 2003 
(hereinafter the Treaty).
20
 The Treaty has only been in force between the two states since 
April 2007, even though the UK has been acting in accordance with its terms since the 2003 
Act entered into force, 1 January 2004.
21
 It is comprised of 24 articles that stipulate the basis 
upon which persons are extradited between the two countries, several articles of which are of 
particular relevance here. Article 1 provides that both parties are under a general obligation to 
extradite between themselves where the terms of the agreement are met. Article 2 defines 
―extraditable offences‖. This generally includes those offences criminal within both states and 
punishable by more than one year imprisonment upon conviction. Article 2(4) is of particular 
note, it provides that extraterritorial offences are extraditable. It states: 
 
If the offense has been committed outside the territory of the Requesting State, 
extradition shall be granted in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty if the 
laws in the Requested State provide for the punishment of such conduct committed 
outside its territory in similar circumstances. If the laws in the Requested State do not 
provide for the punishment of such conduct committed outside of its territory in 
similar circumstances, the executive authority of the Requested State, in its 
discretion, may grant extradition provided that all other requirements of this Treaty 
are met.
22
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 Section 3. The Police and Justice Act 2006 also created the new ancillary offence under section 3A 
of making, adapting, supplying or obtaining articles used to commit offences under the 1990 Act.  Note 
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19
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20
 2003, No. 1, Cmnd 5821, cited at <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/USExtradition_210503.pdf>.  
21
 The United States Senate did not ratify the Treaty until 29 September 2006. The unequal application 
of the treaty was one of the main criticisms that had been levied against United Kingdom extraditions 
to the United States. The Treaty is now in force between the two countries with instruments of 
Ratification being exchanged by Home Office Minister Baroness Scotland and United States 
Ambassador to the United Kingdom Robert Tuttle 26 April 2007, see 
<http://london.usembassy.gov/ukpapress48.html>. 
22
 It is notable that only in the original hearing at Bow Street Magistrates Court was it argued that the 
locus of the offences, arguably being outside the United States, had an affect on the case. Subsequently 
it appears to have been accepted that the offences were committed within the United States.   
 The requisite documents to be provided and necessary procedures to be followed are specified 
in article 8. As will be seen below, these have engendered some criticism in that the 
requirements on the United States when making requests are less than upon the United 
Kingdom when it is seeking an individual through extradition.  
 
Within the United Kingdom extradition is governed by the Extradition Act 2003 (the 2003 
Act) which, amongst other things, gives force to the Treaty. The 2003 Act establishes two 
main sets of arrangements. The first, in Part 1, relates to extradition within the 27 Category 1 
territories which have implemented the Council Framework Decision 13 June 2002 on the 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and surrender procedure between EU Member States.
23
 Part 
2 generally covers all other states, called Category 2 states, with which the United Kingdom 
has regular extradition dealings including the United States. Where an individual is sought 
from the United Kingdom, as in McKinnon‘s case, the requesting state must intimate this to 
the nominated United Kingdom ―designated authority‖. The precise procedure and required 
documentation is contingent upon whether the request comes from a Category 1 or Category 
2 state. Generally, the procedure is more onerous in regard to Category 2 states. It is assumed 
that the legal systems in those states are less akin to that of the United Kingdom than those 
party to the EAW scheme. Category 2 states requesting extradition are required to include 
with the request particulars of both the accused or convicted person and the particulars of the 
offence specified. Additionally, the request must normally be accompanied by prima facie 
evidence of guilt. Section 84 of the 2003 Act inter alia provides  
 
If the judge is required to proceed under this section he must decide whether there is 
evidence which would be sufficient to make a case requiring an answer by the person 
if the proceedings were ... summary proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to 
have been committed by the person (except that for this purpose evidence from a 
single source shall be sufficient).  
 
Significantly, this condition has been withdrawn in regard to extradition requests from the 
United States, amongst other countries.
24
 Subsequent to a Category 2 request meeting the 
required formalities, and where that state is exempted from providing evidence, Bow Street 
Magistrates‘ Court in England and Wales or the Sheriff Court of Lothian and the Borders in 
Scotland must consider, according to the 2003 Act, whether the extradition is barred on the 
basis the rule against double jeopardy, the passage of time, hostage taking considerations, 
political motivations and human rights grounds. If no bar is held to exist the case is passed to 
the Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers to make the final extradition decision.
25
 The 
Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers are then obliged to consider a number of factors 
which, if satisfied, prevent the extradition going ahead including the death penalty and 
speciality.
26
 If none are met the extradition must proceed. As noted above, a double 
criminality requirement applies to Category 2 extraditions with the definition of ―extradition 
offence‖ stipulating that the act alleged by the requesting state is also criminal in the United 
Kingdom.
27
 Therefore all extraditions from the United Kingdom must be made in relation to 
activities that would also be criminal in at least one of the jurisdictions within it. 
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 The Case 
 
McKinnon‘s fight against extradition is long and complex. It formally commenced with a 
request for his extradition from the United States dated 7 October 2004. Informally, but 
importantly, the extradition request was preceded by three things, United Kingdom assistance 
with the United States investigation, the returning of two indictments by American Grand 
Juries and detailed plea bargaining negotiations.
28
 Whilst all these are relevant, the latter is of 
particular significance – forming the basis of the appeal to the House of Lords – and will be 
discussed below. The first judicial decision in McKinnon‘s case was made on 10 May 2006 in 
Bow Street Magistrates‘ Court where District Judge Nicholas Evans held that the extradition 
process should continue and the United States request be passed to the Secretary of State. 
There were six distinct arguments made on behalf of McKinnon in front of the Divisional 
Court.
29
 These were that the designation of the United States as a territory that need not 
provide prima facie evidence was unlawful and ultra vires, that McKinnon‘s conduct did not 
meet the definition of an extradition offence on account of the locus of his acts, that his 
extradition was barred because he was being prosecuted on account of his political beliefs, 
that his extradition was in breach of human rights, that his extradition entailed an abuse of 
process and that the United States practice disregarded the speciality principle of extradition. 
All these arguments were rejected.
30
 The District Judge then, pursuant to the 2003 Act, sent 
the case to the Secretary of State for decision who, on 4 July 2006, granted McKinnon‘s 
extradition.  
 
The next stage in McKinnon‘s legal battle entailed an unsuccessful appeal to the High Court 
of the Divisional Court and Secretary of State decisions.
31
 Four separate arguments were 
made by McKinnon before the High Court. It was averred that his extradition was barred 
because he was being prosecuted on account of his nationality or political opinions or that if 
extradited he might be prejudiced at his trial or punished for these reasons.
32
 The passage of 
time between the commission of the alleged offences and first extradition hearing and certain 
human rights grounds were the bases of the third and fourth arguments. Finally, and this was 
the issue that the House of Lords later considered, it was argued that his extradition would 
result in an abuse of process in that inter alia McKinnon had declined a plea bargain. The 
High Court dismissed each argument in turn. In regard to the first the Court held that the 
suggestion that McKinnon would suffer prejudice on account of his political opinions by an 
American judge or jury was entirely without merit. The particular facts surrounding the case 
led the Court to hold that the passage of time did not bar extradition. The period of five years 
and three months was not excessive, the Court held, on account of the complexity of the case. 
In regard to human rights, McKinnon argued that his article 8 Convention rights would be 
unlawfully infringed. The Court held that there were not the ―exceptional‖ circumstances 
necessary in his case to hold human rights grounds as a bar to the extradition. Finally, the 
Court failed to find an abuse of process in the circumstances of the offer of a plea bargain. 
Like in the House of Lords decision a Canadian precedent where an abuse of process was 
found in a plea bargaining case, USA v Cobb
33
, was distinguished on its facts. 
 
The last stage of McKinnon‘s United Kingdom-based judicial fight against extradition was 
his appeal to the House of Lords. One question formed the basis of the appeal, whether:  
 
                                                     
28
 As noted in the House of Lords decision, supra note 2 at para 5.  
29
 These are summarised in the High Court decision, supra note 5 at para 10.  
30
 As will be seen, most of these arguments were made again later in one or other stage of the judicial 
process, and as such will be discussed below.    
31
 Supra note 25.  
32
 Under ss 79(1) (b), 81(a) and 81(b) of the 2003 Act.  
33
 [2001] 1 Supreme Court Reports 587.  
It was an abuse of process of extradition proceedings, such that the proceedings be 
stayed, and/or an unjustified interference with the defendants human rights, for the 
requesting state to engage in plea bargaining, including a threat to the defendant that, 
unless he agrees to be extradited, reparation to the United Kingdom to serve any 
sentence imposed, in the requesting state will not be supported by the prosecuting 
authorities in the requesting state.
34
 
 
On 30 July 2008 the House of Lords unanimously dismissed McKinnon‘s appeal. It firstly 
held that his reference to the human rights protected by articles 5 and 6 of the European 
Convention added nothing to the abuse of process claim. The Court then focused on 
McKinnon‘s core argument which was that the plea bargain offer by the United States 
authorities entailed such a disparity in possible sentence (3-4 years with only 6 months to be 
served in a low security United States prison as against 8-10 years in a United States high 
security prison) that ―disproportionate‖ and ―impermissible pressure‖ to surrender his legal 
rights was placed upon him.
35
 In support of this argument McKinnon relied on Cobb.
36
 In that 
case the Supreme Court of Canada upheld an abuse of process argument where a United 
States trial judge had said if those concerned do not co-operate with, and surrender to, 
Pennsylvanian authorities then ―… as far as I am concerned they are going to get the absolute 
maximum jail sentence that the law permits me to give‖.37 Further, a prosecuting attorney had 
stated that those who do not co-operate could ―… wind up serving a great deal longer 
sentence under much more stringent conditions‖ which he said to mean that the accused is  
―… going to be the boyfriend of a very bad man if you wait out your extradition‖.38 
McKinnon‘s reliance on Cobb was to no avail, as the case was distinguished by the House of 
Lords. It held the differences between his circumstances and those in Cobb were ―striking‖.39 
Interestingly, Lord Brown in the leading judgment noted that the difference between the 
United States and English system in regard to pre-trial negotiations and guilty pleas is ―… not 
perhaps so stark as the appellant‘s argument suggests‖.40 He then notes that in England there 
is a clearly recognised discount for a plea of guilty and that it is ―accepted practice… for the 
parties to hold off-the-record discussions whereby the prosecutor will accept pleas of guilty to 
lesser charges… in return for a defendant‘s timely guilty plea‖.41  
 
The final judicial stage of McKinnon‘s opposition to extradition took place in Strasbourg at 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Interestingly the substantive arguments put 
forward were not akin to those made in the House of Lords to the effect that the plea 
bargaining system entailed a breach of his human rights. Instead novel arguments were made 
that he would suffer torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment due to the 
conditions in which he would be detained if convicted in the United States. This argument, at 
least in part, seems to be based on suffering from a form of autism, Aspergers Syndrome. At 
the ECtHR McKinnon‘s lawyers firstly requested and were granted under article 39 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights interim relief to the effect that McKinnon not be 
extradited until the ECtHR heard the arguments. The ECtHR then considered his request for 
interim measures on 28 August and refused them.
42
 McKinnon‘s judicial options came to an 
end with this decision. He has, however, started a last ditched effort by way of a plea to the 
Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith. This is not a further attempt to block his extradition. As noted 
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 Supra note 2 at para 7.  
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 Ibid at para 28. 
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 Supra note 33.  
37
 Ibid at 593, cited in US v McKinnon, supra note 2 at para 30. 
38
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39
 Supra note 2 at para 39. 
40
 Ibid at para 34.  
41
 Ibid.  
42
 Supra note 7.  
above, political intervention in the extradition process is now not possible.
43
 It is instead an 
attempt to ensure that McKinnon is either tried in the United Kingdom, or alternatively that 
he will be repatriated back to the United Kingdom to serve any sentence if convicted. These 
pleas appear to be based on McKinnon‘s particular medical condition.44  
 
Analysis 
 
Analysis of McKinnon‘s case history, present predicament and likely future gives rise to a 
number of facts, or ―lessons‖, that deserve emphasis. They also reinforce a number of 
criticisms that can and have been made of extradition law and practice. The first main and 
obvious lesson is that being physically remote from the United States is almost immaterial 
when it comes to being charged there with a criminal offence. Indeed, McKinnon‘s case is, in 
this regard, just the latest instance of such a ―long-arm‖ prosecution. Other recent cases 
include that of David Calder
45
, Brian and Kerry-Anne Howes
46
 and the NatWest Three.
47
 In 
each of these cases the accused (or in the case of the NatWest Three convicted) person(s) 
acted in the United Kingdom yet ―committed‖ their offences in the United States. The 
extension or extraterritorial application of United States criminal law, it seems, has never 
been so pronounced and in regard to the United Kingdom, effective. In regard to the former, 
the more marked operation of American law, there has been a heightened degree of 
prosecutorial vigour in the United States in the recent past. This can in part be understood by 
the relatively politicised role of certain criminal prosecutors there. As it has been noted ―A 
US federal prosecutor is a political appointment; it‘s about how may scalps they can claim‖.48 
Certainly in high profile cases, such as the NatWest Three - being connected with the demise 
of Enron, and McKinnon - with the integrity of seemingly vital computer systems being 
breached, the apprehension and conviction of a person or persons involved or responsible 
could result in the prosecutor responsible gaining not inconsiderable political kudos. 
Regardless of the particular motive behind United States prosecution it is clear that the locus 
of an accused and his physical acts provides no barrier to future American prosecution. The 
increased effectiveness of United States ―long-arm‖ prosecutions can be largely attributed to 
the 2003 Act. As seen above, the possibility of political factors affecting United Kingdom 
extradition decisions has been removed - the residual discretion once held by the Home 
Secretary exists no longer. This, along with the removal of the requirement that a prima facie 
case be made out by United States requesting authorities has, to some extent, streamlined and 
expedited extradition proceedings. However, again as noted above, McKinnon‘s judicial saga, 
commencing with the formal extradition request, has persisted for over four years.   
 
A second ―lesson‖ to be taken or learnt from McKinnon‘s case is in regard to the disparity of 
likely prison sentences in the United States and the United Kingdom for those convicted of 
similar offences. Here sentencing practice indicates that the United States imposes sentences 
of a considerably longer duration than those for similar offences in the United Kingdom. That 
noted, the stated terms of the individual statutory offences relevant in McKinnon‘s case in the 
United Kingdom and the United States are of equivalent duration. The difference between the 
two states appears to be in regard to the cumulative nature of the sentences. As was seen 
                                                     
43
 Under the previous regime, governed in large part by the Extradition Act 1989, political discretion 
existed at the end of the process. This was infamously exercised in favour of Augusto Pinochet by Jack 
Straw in January 2000, see < http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/599681.stm>. 
44
 See Hacker Loses Extradition Appeal, 28 August 2008, at 
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 See Calder v HMA, [2006] SCCR 609, and generally Arnell, supra note 1.  
46
 See Re. Howes, 2008 WL 2033440 
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 See Bermingham and others (R on the application of) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the 
Home Secretary [2006] EWHC (Admin) 200, and generally Bamford, N., Extradition and the 
Commercial World, 2007 (28) Company Lawyer 97.  
48
 Extradited at a moment‘s notice: is it time to be afraid of doing business in America, The 
Independent, 2 December 2007.  
above, the upper limit among the various estimations of McKinnon‘s prison sentence if 
convicted in the United States is 70 years. This figure is achieved by adding the maximum 
sentence of 10 years for each separate offence. A sentence of this duration is certainly in 
excess of that McKinnon might receive if tried and convicted in the United Kingdom for 
similar offences. By way of illustration is the decision in R. v Vallor .
49
 Here Vallor pleaded 
guilty to three counts of breaching s 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and was sentenced to 
two years‘ imprisonment. On appeal the Court held that four years was the appropriate 
sentence, but that certain mitigating circumstances in the case led to two years being imposed. 
Admittedly, this decision related to the previous tariffs and the offences were not directed at 
the United Kingdom security services. It is clear, though, that in general terms the sentencing 
policy in the United States is markedly more severe in the sense of longer prison sentences 
than in the United Kingdom.
50
 Ironically, the recent increases in sentencing powers 
introduced into the Computer Misuse Act 1990 may minimise the likelihood of a McKinnon-
esque extradition process from becoming commonplace. The increased sentencing powers 
under the 1990 Act may have two consequences. Firstly, Category 2 States may be more 
amenable to consenting to a prosecution in the United Kingdom for computer-related activity 
if the mis-match between sentencing powers of the requesting state and the United Kingdom 
is significantly reduced. Indeed, the prosecutorial zeal of the American authorities may be 
assuaged if they come to appreciate that the United Kingdom treats computer-related crime as 
a priority. The second, related consequence of the increased sentencing powers available, is 
that, over time, United Kingdom citizens will come to appreciate that their online activities, 
undertaken in the comfortable confines of their personal space, may have serious and 
dramatic consequences for their liberty. Thus, the deterrent effect of an increased sentence 
may minimise the number of people tempted to ‗hack‘ and ‗crack‘ computer systems.   
A third ―lesson‖ to be learnt from McKinnon‘s case is that it is on occasion perhaps not too 
difficult, technically, to breach governmental computer systems or otherwise commit an 
offence deemed serious by prosecuting authorities.
51
 Indeed McKinnon‘s lawyer suggested in 
the High Court that the United States prosecution was political because ―... the US 
Government has been embarrassed at the ease with which Mr McKinnon obtained access to 
supposedly secure computers‖.52 McKinnon himself has been noted as commenting that ―... 
he used a very basic tool which scanned networks for blank passwords and found some very 
poor security‖.53 Indeed, it has further been written that he was tracked down relatively easily, 
demonstrating his lack of technical savvy. This has been reported as being through the use of 
his girlfriend‘s email account.54 Clearly the point that it may not be too difficult to commit a 
serious offence should weigh strongly in support of the view that one should not engage in 
attempts to do so on a frivolous or fleeting basis. Indeed, together with the geographic 
remoteness from the United States and, perhaps, resultant failure to appreciate the degree of 
seriousness in which the acts were taken, these facts facilitate a greater degree of 
comprehension of how one could come to commit an offence. Of course this is not to suggest 
that McKinnon is not culpable of breaking the law, but rather that the circumstances of the 
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offences are surely such to provide a stern warning to anyone considering testing out their 
technical savvy against the security of United States governmental computer systems.  
 
In addition to bringing to the fore notable facts surrounding United States criminal law and 
practice and the apparent ease in which a serious offence can be committed, McKinnon‘s case 
also highlights several specific features of extradition law and practice that deserve criticism. 
The first centres upon the inequity in evidential requirement upon the United States and the 
United Kingdom. As seen above, no evidence against McKinnon was required by the United 
Kingdom in conjunction with the United States extradition request. In the opposite case, 
where the United Kingdom seeks an individual from the United States, evidence is required.  
Here the United Kingdom requesting authorities must provide evidence that satisfies an 
American court that there is ―probable cause‖ that the individual committed the offence, as 
stipulated in the treaty between the two states.
55
 A second criticism relates to United States 
plea bargaining. As was argued in the House of Lords, the pressure to co-operate with United 
States authorities because of the large disparity in possible sentence and the issue of when 
repatriation may be permitted may amount to an abuse of process. Whilst the House of Lords 
dismissed this argument in McKinnon‘s case, it is submitted that plea bargaining, in extremis, 
whether in the United States, England or Scotland, is an abuse of process. Further, again in 
McKinnon‘s specific case, there is an unfortunate parallel with the Canadian Supreme Court 
decision of US v Cobb, referred to above, in that suggestions of possible male rape have been 
made. Admittedly, in Cobb, this was alluded to by a possible future prosecutor, and in 
McKinnon‘s case the threat is said to have come from US Army personnel and posted on the 
―Free Gary‖ website.56 A third criticism is based on a possible breach of McKinnon‘s human 
rights. As he argued in the High Court there is a concern that McKinnon‘s right to privacy 
and family life under article 8 of the Convention will be disproportionately infringed if 
extradited. Clearly it will be infringed; he will be separated from his family and friends. The 
question is whether this is proportionate. The High Court held that the circumstances of his 
case were not ―exceptional‖ so as to result in human rights being a bar to his extradition. 
Whilst the sentencing outcome of the United States proceedings cannot be foreseen, it is 
submitted that the maximum mooted sentence of 70 years imprisonment in a United States 
high security prison - with the added threat of sexual assault - is indeed exceptional.  
 
A final, and more general, criticism that can be made of the law relates to the lack of 
sufficient response to the increased degree and nature of extraterritorial jurisdiction being 
assumed, by the United States in particular. One such response could be a clear and attendant 
system of allocation of jurisdiction between states. There is at present no such system and the 
provision in the area that does exist is devised to minimise prosecutorial conflict not protect 
accused persons. In regard to extraterritoriality generally it is firstly clear that the criminal law 
increasingly applies to acts committed outwith a state‘s borders. From historical examples of 
murder and counterfeiting to recent incarnations of commercial fraud and computer misuse – 
the range of acts covered by extraterritorial prescription has grown considerably. This in itself 
is understandable and indeed desirable in light of the growing internationality of criminal 
behaviour. However, at the same time, it is not unreasonable for limits or conditions to be 
placed on this phenomenon. The development of a proper law of the crime approach, for 
example, with binding force, would be welcome.
57
 What has happened instead has been the 
continuation of unilaterally assumed extraterritorial jurisdiction and, relatively recently, 
prosecutorial moves to enhance co-operation between the United Kingdom and United States. 
This is found in the Attorney General and Lord Advocate‘s Guidance for Handling Criminal 
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Cases with Concurrent Jurisdiction between the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America.
58
 The Guidance, as its name implies, is non-binding and is intended to promote 
close prosecutorial cooperation between the two countries and reduce the risk of proceedings 
being brought in the two jurisdictions simultaneously.
59
 Whilst it has some value in that 
regard, it does not address arguably egregious instances of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
 
A further development that would affect the increasing degree of extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
the entry into force of the ―forum bar‖ amendment within the Police and Justice Act 2006. 
That Act inserted a new section 83A into the Extradition Act 2003. It provides:  
 
(1) A person‘s extradition to a category 2 territory (―the requesting territory‖) is 
barred by reason of forum if (and only if) it appears that— (a) a significant part of the 
conduct alleged to constitute the extradition offence is conduct in the United 
Kingdom, and (b) in view of that and all the other circumstances, it would not be in 
the interests of justice for the person to be tried for the offence in the requesting 
territory. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) the judge must take into account 
whether the relevant prosecution authorities in the United Kingdom have decided not 
to take proceedings against the person in respect of the conduct in question.
60
 
 
This provision would empower judges to refuse an extradition request on the ground of forum 
non conveniens and could usefully address certain of the contentious issues arising from the 
assumption of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Of course it is debatable whether in McKinnon‘s 
case a court within the United Kingdom would hold that it was ―not in the interests of justice‖ 
for McKinnon to be extradited. In light of the primary and sole ―victim‖ being United States 
computer systems it is not unreasonable to hold that a court would not uphold the forum bar 
in his case. As the law stands, however, a court will not have to make such a determination. 
This is unfortunate. The amendment has not been brought into force, and it appears unlikely 
at the present time that it ever will.
61
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Gary McKinnon clearly faces an unenviable fate. An extradition system designed and 
implemented to address international terrorism shortly after the September 11 2001 terrorist 
attacks in the United States has been widened to cover, inter alia, computer misuse. In light of 
recent United States prosecutorial practice – and no statements from politicians or judicial 
decisions within the United Kingdom to the contrary - it is likely that the use of extradition 
law in this way will happen again. Whilst it appears McKinnon is guilty of causing criminal 
damage and, perhaps, endangering United States security temporarily, his likely fate seems 
out of proportion to these acts. Clearly, the case adds weight to the arguments in favour of 
bringing the forum bar to extradition into force and otherwise mitigating the unrestricted 
application of United States extraterritorial jurisdiction. It is clear that at present the long arm 
of United States law has at its end, to borrow a phrase used in another context by Tony Blair, 
a big clunking fist.
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